History as a widespread externality in some Arrow-Debreu market games
Year of publication: |
1999
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hammond, Peter J. |
Published in: |
Markets, information, and uncertainty : essays in economic theory in honor of Kenneth J. Arrow. - Cambridge [u.a.] : Cambridge Univ. Press, ISBN 0-521-55355-5. - 1999, p. 328-361
|
Subject: | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | General equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
-
History as a widespread externality in some Arrow-Debreu market games
Hammond, Peter J., (1993)
-
Complementarities, comparative statics, and nonconvexities in market economies
Shannon, Chris, (1992)
-
The partnered core of an economy and the partnered competitive equilibrium
Page, Frank H., (1996)
- More ...
-
Roberts' Weak Welfarism Theorem: A Minor Correction
Hammond, Peter J., (1999)
-
Individual Welfare and Subjective Well-Being : Commentary Inspired by Sacks, Stevenson and Wolfers
Hammond, Peter J., (2011)
-
Affine Models of the Joint Dynamics of Exchange Rates and Interest Rates
Anderson, Bing, (2010)
- More ...