Holdups, Quality Choice, and the Achilles' Heel in Government Contracting
Year of publication: |
2001-08
|
---|---|
Authors: | Bös, Dieter ; Lülfesmann, Christoph |
Institutions: | University of Bonn, Germany |
Subject: | Procurement | Incomplete Contracts | Quality Choice | Governance Structure |
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