How and why moral hazard has distorted financial regulation
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Gaillard, Norbert ; Michalek, Richard J. |
Published in: |
The failure of financial regulation : why a major crisis could happen again. - Cham, Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan, ISBN 978-3-030-05679-7. - 2019, p. 111-151
|
Subject: | Credit rating agencies | Debt | Federal Reserve | Financial regulation | Glass-Steagall | Moral hazard | Securities and Exchange Commission | Too big to fail | Moral Hazard | Regulierung | Regulation | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Finanzmarktregulierung | Financial market regulation | Ratingagentur | Rating agency | Finanzmarktaufsicht | Financial supervision |
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