How Borda Voting Rule Can Respect Arrow IIA and Avoid Cloning Manipulation

This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with the problem of cloning manipulation. This new Borda voting specification will be named: Dynamic Borda Voting (DBV) and it satisfies Arrow's IIA condition. The calculations, propositions with proof and explanations are made to show the effectiveness of this method. From DBV, the paper presents a method to measure and quantify the magnitude of the shock due to change in irrelevant alternatives over a scale moving from 0 to 100

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Dombou T., Dany R.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Theorie \| Theory \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Wahlverhalten \| Voting behaviour \| Unmöglichkeitstheorem \| Impossibility theorem

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Economics Bibliography, KSP Journals, vol. 4(3), pages 234-243 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments September 1, 2017 erstellt
Classification:	C60 - Mathematical Methods and Programming. General ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033616