How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Brams, Steven J. ; Kilgour, D. Marc |
Published in: |
Games, groups, and the global good. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-540-85435-5. - 2009, p. 229-241
|
Subject: | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Demokratie | Democracy | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Kooperation | Cooperation | Theorie | Theory |
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