How do risk-averse litigants set contingent fees for risk-neutral lawyers?
Year of publication: |
2019
|
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Authors: | Pak, Sŏng-hun ; Lee, Sanghack |
Published in: |
Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with European Association of Law and Economics .... - Berlin : De Gruyter, ISSN 1555-5879, ZDB-ID 2191851-X. - Vol. 15.2019, 2, p. 1-19
|
Subject: | bilateral delegation | contingent fee | initial endowment | litigation | risk aversion | Theorie | Theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Rechtsberatung | Legal services | Zivilprozess | Civil litigation | Gebühr | Charges | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Gerichtliche Prozesskosten | Litigation costs | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law |
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