How (not) to incent crowd workers : payment schemes and feedback in crowdsourcing
Year of publication: |
June 2015
|
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Authors: | Straub, Tim ; Gimpel, Henner ; Teschner, Florian ; Weinhardt, Christof |
Published in: |
Business & information systems engineering : BISE ; the international journal of Wirtschaftsinformatik. - Wiesbaden : Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ISSN 2363-7005, ZDB-ID 2484159-6. - Vol. 57.2015, 3, p. 167-179
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Subject: | Crowdsourcing | Online labor | Incentives | Exploratory study | Experimental study | Experimental techniques | Real effort task | Rank-order tournament | Piece rate | Feedback | Experiment | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Anreiz | Theorie | Theory | Akkordlohn | Leistungsmotivation | Work motivation | Arbeitsleistung | Job performance |
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