How powerful CFOs camouflage and exploit equity-based incentive compensation
Denton Collins, Gary Fleischman, Stacey Kaden, Juan Manuel Sanchez
| Year of publication: |
December (I) 2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Collins, Denton ; Fleischman, Gary ; Kaden, Stacey ; Sanchez, Juan Manuel |
| Published in: |
Journal of business ethics : JOBE. - Dordrecht : Springer, ISSN 0167-4544, ZDB-ID 868017-6. - Vol. 153.2018, 2, p. 591-613
|
| Subject: | Chief financial officers | Compensation | Pay duration | Incentives | Earnings management | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Bilanzpolitik | Accounting policy | Finanzmanager | Financial managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s10551-016-3427-9 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011952650