How to compensate physicians when both patient and physician effort are unobservable

Kenneth L. Leonard ...

Year of publication:	21 Mar. 2000 ; [Elektronische Ressource]
Other Persons:	Leonard, Kenneth Lynch (contributor) ; Zivin, Joshua S. Graff (contributor)
Institutions:	Columbia University / Department of Economics (contributor)
Publisher:	New York, NY : Social Science Electronic Publ.
Subject:	Gesundheitsversorgung \| Health care \| Arzthonorar \| Physician fees \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Moral Hazard \| Moral hazard \| Theorie \| Theory \| Kamerun \| Cameroon \| Traditionelle Medizin \| Traditional medicine

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