How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Barros, Pedro ; Clougherty, Joseph ; Seldeslachts, Jo
Published in:	International Journal of the Economics of Business. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 1357-1516. - Vol. 17.2010, 1, p. 1-8
Publisher:	Taylor & Francis Journals
Subject:	Antitrust \| Deterrence \| Merger Policy

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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