How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy : Frequency or Composition?

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Barros, Pedro
Other Persons:	Clougherty, Joseph A. (contributor) ; Seldeslachts, Jo (contributor)
Publisher:	[2009]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Wirkungsanalyse \| Impact assessment \| Wettbewerbspolitik \| Competition policy \| Kartellrecht \| Antitrust law \| Kanada \| Canada \| EU-Staaten \| EU countries \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Fusionskontrolle \| Merger control

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
Series:	WZB Working Paper ; No. SP II 2009-13
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 3, 2009 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1499074 [DOI]
Classification:	L40 - Antitrust Policy. General ; L49 - Antitrust Policy. Other ; K21 - Antitrust Law
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155108