How to Measure the Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy: Frequency or Composition?

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

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Year of publication:	2009-09
Authors:	Barros, Pedro Luis Pita ; Clougherty, Joseph A. ; Seldeslachts, Jo
Institutions:	C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Subject:	antitrust \| deterrence \| merger policy

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CEPR Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 7454
Classification:	K21 - Antitrust Law ; L40 - Antitrust Policy. General ; L49 - Antitrust Policy. Other
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008577815