How to measure the deterrence effects of merger policy: Frequency or composition?

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Barros, Pedro P. ; Clougherty, Joseph A. ; Seldeslachts, Jo
Publisher:	Berlin : Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Subject:	antitrust \| deterrence \| merger polic

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Series:	WZB Discussion Paper ; SP II 2009-13
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/51207 [Handle]
Classification:	L40 - Antitrust Policy. General ; L49 - Antitrust Policy. Other ; K21 - Antitrust Law
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280624