How transaction costs obstruct collective action : the case of California's groundwater
Year of publication: |
2018
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ayres, Andrew B. ; Edwards, Eric C. ; Libecap, Gary D. |
Published in: |
Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696, ZDB-ID 188687-3. - Vol. 91.2018, p. 46-65
|
Subject: | Bargaining | Collective action | Common-pool resource | Contracting costs | Groundwater | Property rights | Transaction costs | Transaktionskosten | Gemeingüter | Commons | Grundwasser | Kollektives Handeln | Sachenrecht | Law of property | Wasserversorgung | Water supply | Gewässerschutz | Water conservation | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | Theory of property rights |
-
How Transaction Costs Obstruct Collective Action : Evidence from California's Groundwater
Ayres, Andrew, (2017)
-
How transaction costs obstruct collective action : evidence from California' s groundwater
Ayres, Andrew B., (2017)
-
How Transaction Costs Obstruct Collective Action : Evidence from California’s Groundwater
Ayres, Andrew B., (2017)
- More ...
-
How transaction costs obstruct collective action : evidence from California' s groundwater
Ayres, Andrew B., (2017)
-
How Transaction Costs Obstruct Collective Action : Evidence from California’s Groundwater
Ayres, Andrew B., (2017)
-
Water institutions and the law of one price
Edwards, Eric C.,
- More ...