Ideal Types and the Problem of Reification (Hypostatization)

Most social scientists are aware that ideal types are merely constructs that pick out, indeed exaggerate preselected aspects of social reality. Nevertheless, a widespread tendency remains to hypostatize (reify) them, to treat them as if they referred to real entities existing in the social world, independently of observation. This paper shows why the very attempt to avoid reification by denying existence to social things encourages a tendency to hypostatize (reify) ideal types and other constructs which social science imposes on social reality. It argues that without a realistic ontology of the social, it is difficult to envision how social reality might "kick" at the constructs social science seeks to impose upon them and render them problematic. The constructs of science select out of an infinite universe of facts only those which they, themselves, have predetermined to be germane. Once selected, facts become psychologically fused with the constructs that selected them. To be sure, all science attempts to simplify and typify the reality it seeks to represent. However, in healthy scientific research, the assumption of a reality independent of the constructs science attempts to impose on it can compel scientists to abandon or modify these constructs. After examining the pitfall of hypostatization (reification), the paper explores various concrete sources of orderliness in social reality that can serve as objective constraints on the hypotheses social science seeks to impose on them