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Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable

Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.
Year of publication:
2011
Authors: Shneyerov, Artyom ; Wong, Adam Chi Leung
Published in:
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 72.2011, 2, p. 574-582
Publisher: Elsevier
Subject: Nonparametric identification Auctions
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Type of publication: Article
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009195085
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