Identifying and testing models of managerial compensation
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gayle, George-Levi ; Miller, Robert Allen |
Published in: |
The review of economic studies. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 0034-6527, ZDB-ID 209928-7. - Vol. 82.2015, 3, p. 1074-1118
|
Subject: | Managerial compensation | Moral hazard | Hidden information | Empirical content | Partial identification | Semiparametric | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Nichtparametrisches Verfahren | Nonparametric statistics |
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