Imitation and Selective Matching in Reputational Games

This paper investigates imitation and selective matching in reputational games with an outside option. We identify two classes of such games, which are ultimatum and trust games. By selective matching we mean that short-runplayers have the possibility of selecting the long-run player they play against. We find that selective matching (unlike random matching) favors the equilibrium associated to reputation in the ultimatum game but not in the trust game.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Vignolo, Thierry
Institutions:	Department of Economics, European University Institute
Subject:	Reputation \| Long-run equilibria \| Selective matching \| Games with an outside option

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Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series European University Institute Working Papers Number ECO2007/31
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005557710