Imitation perfection - a simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement

Procurement regulation aimed at curbing discrimination requires equal treatment of sellers. However, Deb and Pai (2016) show that such regulation poses virtually no restriction on the ability to discriminate. We propose a simple rule – imitation perfection – that restricts discrimination significantly. With homogeneous bidders, imitation perfection implies that all bidders earn the same surplus in every equilibrium conditional on their valuation.

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Year of publication:	2017
Authors:	Mass, Helene ; Fugger, Nicolas ; Gretschko, Vitali ; Wambach, Achim
Publisher:	Kiel, Hamburg : ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

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Series:	Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Auctions ; E09-V1
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Conference Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/168217 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:vfsc17:168217 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011712730