Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle : the multi-agent case

Helmut Bester; Roland Strausz

Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Bester, Helmut ; Strausz, Roland
Published in:	Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 69.2000, 2, p. 165-171
Subject:	Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Informationsverhalten \| Information behaviour \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Theorie \| Theory

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