Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle : the multi-agent case with transferable utility
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Evans, Robert ; Reiche, Soenje |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 99.2008, 3, p. 611-614
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Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Theorie | Theory |
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