Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: the Multi-Agent Case with Transferable Utility

Bester and Strausz (2000) showed that the revelation principle of Bester and Strausz (2001) does not apply in a setting of many agents and no commitment. In their counterexample only one agent has private information. We show that if the parties can make ex ante transfers the revelation principle does extend to this setting. However, we show that it does not extend to a setting in which more than one agent has private information.

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Year of publication:	2007-05
Authors:	Evans, R. ; Reich, S.
Institutions:	Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge
Subject:	Revelation Principle \| Commitment \| Asymmetric Information

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Ec 2 pages long
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005647422