Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations

We study the long-run sustainability of reputations in games with imperfect public monitoring. It is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the game without uncertainty about types. Thus, a player cannot indefinitely sustain a reputation for non-credible behavior in the presence of imperfect monitoring.

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Year of publication:	2002-07-30
Authors:	Cripps, Martin W. ; Mailath, George J. ; Samuelson, Larry
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
Subject:	Reputation \| Imperfect Monitoring \| Repeated Games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	PIER Working Paper Archive.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	32 pages
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126688