Imperfectly Observable Commitments in n-Player Games

In a two-stage extensive form game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for generic games, there is always at least one subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs.

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Year of publication:	1996-09
Authors:	Gueth, Werner ; Kirchsteiger, Georg ; Ritzberger, Klaus
Institutions:	Department of Economics and Finance Research and Teaching, Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS)
Subject:	Commitments \| Imperfect Observability \| Subgame Perfection

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 35 21 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823264