Implementation in Generic Environments

In this paper, we study implementation in "economic environments". It is shown that there is a dense subset of the set of preference profiles such that given an arbitrary social choice function, f and e > 0, there exits another social choice function g, g within e of f uniformly, and g implementable in Nash equilibrium on the dense subset.

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Year of publication:	1992
Authors:	Bergin, James ; Sen, Arunava
Publisher:	Kingston (Ontario) : Queen's University, Department of Economics

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Series:	Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; 879
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/189203 [Handle] RePEC:qed:wpaper:879 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011940541