Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium

This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of "-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in "-minimax regret equilibrium for all " ? [0, 1).

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Year of publication:	2009-10
Authors:	Renou, Ludovic ; Schlag, Karl H.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Leicester University
Subject:	Implementation \| minimax regret \| Maskin monotonicity

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 09/24
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008565761