Implementation of multi-agent incentive contracts with the principal's renegotiation offer

The purpose of this paper is to explore a mechanism for supporting desired equilibrium actions in a one-principal, multi-agent model when the principal makes a renegotiation offer. We show that there exists a mechanism in which the principal's most preferred mixed strategy is always supported.

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Year of publication:	1999-06-24
Authors:	Osano, Hiroshi
Published in:	Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 4.1999, 2, p. 161-177
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Renegotiation \| multi-agent \| implementation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: 30 May 1997 / Accepted: 10 October 1998
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370595