Implementation of the Recursive Core for Partition Function Form Games

In partition function form games, the recursive core (r-core) is implemented by a modified version of Perry and Reny’s (1994) non-cooperative game. Specifically, every stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SSPNE) outcome is an r-core outcome. With the additional assumption of total r-balancedness, every r-core outcome is an SSPNE outcome.

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Year of publication:	2005-04
Authors:	Huang, Chen Ying ; Sjostrom, Tomas
Institutions:	School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study
Subject:	REcursive Core \| Nash Equilibrium \| Partition Function Form Games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 42(6) p. 771-793, 2006 Number 0052 37 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005345037