Implementation with interdependent valuations
Richard P. McLean; Andrew Postlewaite
| Year of publication: |
2015
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | MacLean, Richard P. ; Postlewaite, Andrew |
| Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 10.2015, 3, p. 923-952
|
| Subject: | Auctions | incentive compatibility | mechanism design | interdependent values | ex post incentive compatibility | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Anreiz | Incentives | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011392733