Implementing Efficient Market Structure

This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the weighted sum of expected social surplus and expected tax revenue, and show that these mechanisms generally avoid budget deficits and prevent excessive entry

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Grimm, Veronika ; Riedel, Frank ; Wolfstetter, Elmar
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Regulierung \| Regulation \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Markteintritt \| Market entry \| Wohlfahrtsanalyse \| Welfare analysis \| Natürliches Monopol \| Natural monopoly \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Konzession \| Concession \| Steuerpolitik \| Tax policy \| Marktstruktur \| Market structure

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