Implications of a multi-purpose reporting system on CEO and CFO incentives and risk preferences
Year of publication: |
2016
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Authors: | Friedman, Henry L. |
Published in: |
Journal of management accounting research : JMAR. - Sarasota, Fla. : Assoc., ISSN 1049-2127, ZDB-ID 1101530-5. - Vol. 28.2016, 3, p. 101-132
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Subject: | reporting | bias | CEO | CFO | risk-aversion | Führungskräfte | Managers | Finanzmanager | Financial managers | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Systematischer Fehler | Bias |
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