Improbable Oppositions : Personalist Rule, Privatization, and Elite Defection in the Post-Soviet Autocracies

This article presents the results of a in-depth study of opposition leaders in five Soviet successor states that have followed markedly different economic paths: market-rejecting Belarus and Turkmenistan, market-reforming Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, a reluctant reformer that falls somewhere in between. Bolstering a growing body of research linking market reforms to the erosion of authoritarian rule, I find that privatizations can inadvertently foster constituencies within the ruling coalition that are willing to publicly oppose rulers who wield extensive formal and personal powers. In sharp contrast to Belarus and Turkmenistan, in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and, surprisingly, Uzbekistan, defectors from the business elite have openly engaged in contentious politics, injecting money and other resources into the opposition (albeit with varying degrees of success). Although privatization decentralizes ownership and enriches a broad swath of elites, all too often a particular group of elites closest to the president hoards the choicest assets. The contradictory processes by which resources are dispersed and yet concentrated have led to open confrontation between ambitious “outsider” elites who have benefited from privatization and “insider” elites set on expanding their assets and maintaining their privileged positions at any cost. Conflict has forced some outsider elites into the opposition, but only after continued loyalty to the regime fails to secure their economic interests