In?nitely Repeated Games with Public Monitoring and Monetary Transfers

In this paper, we study in?nitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. We develop an effcient algorithm to compute the set of pure strategy public perfect equilibrium payoffs for each discount factor. We also show how all equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Goldluecke, Susanne ; Kranz, Sebastian
Publisher:	München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Subject:	Wiederholte Spiele \| Gleichgewicht \| Kontrolle \| Geld \| Theorie

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Series:	SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 332
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5282/ubm/epub.13222 [DOI] 645770574 [GVK] hdl:10419/93777 [Handle] RePEc:trf:wpaper:332 [RePEc]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333754