Incentive auction design alternatives : a simulation study
Year of publication: |
2024
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Authors: | Newman, Neil ; Leyton-Brown, Kevin ; Milgrom, Paul ; Segal, Ilya |
Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5501, ZDB-ID 2023019-9. - Vol. 70.2024, 11, p. 8187-8215
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Subject: | applied game theory | artificial intelligence | auctions | deferred acceptance auction | incentive auction | market design | reverse clock auction | simulation | spectrum auction | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Auktion | Auction | Simulation | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Künstliche Intelligenz | Artificial intelligence | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Mobilkommunikation | Mobile communications | Konzession | Concession |
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