Incentive contracts and elections for politicians with multi-task problems

Hans Gersbach and Verena Liessem

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Gersbach, Hans ; Liessem, Verena
Publisher:	London : Centre for Economic Policy Research
Subject:	Wahl \| Election \| Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie \| Economic theory of democracy \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Theorie \| Theory \| Politische Entscheidung \| Political decision

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