Incentive contracts for managing a project with uncertain completion time
Christopher S. Tang (UCLA Anderson School of Management, Los Angeles, California, USA), Kairen Zhang (Department of Systems Engineering and Engineering Management, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T, Hong Kong), Sean X. Zhou (Department of Decision Sciences and Managerial Economics, CUHK Business School, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T, Hong Kong)
| Year of publication: |
December 2015
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Tang, Christopher S. ; Zhang, Kairen ; Zhou, Sean X. |
| Published in: |
Production and operations management : an international journal of the Production and Operations Management Society. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1059-1478, ZDB-ID 1108460-1. - Vol. 24.2015, 12, p. 1945-1954
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| Subject: | project management | uncertain completion time | incentive contracts | Projektmanagement | Project management | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risiko | Risk |