Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities

Víctor Gonzáles-Jiménez

Year of publication:	May 2021
Authors:	Gonzáles-Jiménez, Víctor
Publisher:	[Wien] : Universität Wien, Department of Economics
Subject:	Contracts \| Risk Attitude \| Incentives \| Probability Weighting \| Experiments \| Risikopräferenz \| Risk attitude \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Experiment \| Anreiz \| Vertrag \| Contract \| Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung \| Probability theory \| Risiko \| Risk \| Prospect Theory \| Prospect theory

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