Incentive design for reference-dependent preferences
Víctor González-Jiménez
| Year of publication: |
2024
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Gonzalez Jimenez, Victor H. |
| Subject: | Bonuses | Contract theory | Loss aversion | Principal-agent models | Reference dependence | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Vertragstheorie | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory | Anreiz | Incentives | Verlust | Loss | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
freely available
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.005 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014553209