Incentive Targeting, Influence Peddling, and Foreign Direct Investment
We expand the traditional tax incentive redundancy argument by investigating the implications of allocating incentives primarily to firms that would have invested even in the absence of special tax treatment. Incorporating government revenue constraints, pliable tax officials, endogenous tax liabilities, and firms with heterogeneous before-tax returns, we show that tax incentives, if given to the "wrong" firms, are not only ineffective in stimulating FDI, but result in a form of tax shifting and may reduce FDI. Data from countries of the former Eastern Bloc suggests that tax incentive schemes have significantly negative impacts on FDI in countries that poorly target firms.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Edmiston, Kelly D. ; Mudd, Shannon ; Valev, Neven T. |
Published in: |
International Tax and Public Finance. - Springer, ISSN 0927-5940. - Vol. 11.2004, 5, p. 647-660
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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