Incentives and the Structure of Teams
may, on their own, generate monotone matching predictions in the absence of complementarities or anti-complementarities in production technology. We also derive sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model leading to the optimality of positive and negative matching of team members.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Mitchell, Matt ; Vereshchagina, Galina ; Franco, April |
Institutions: | Society for Economic Dynamics - SED |
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