Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract
Year of publication: |
1-15 October 2016
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Authors: | Chunyan Gao ; Cheng, T. C. E. ; Houcai Shen ; Xu, Liang |
Published in: |
International journal of production research. - London : Taylor & Francis, ISSN 0020-7543, ZDB-ID 160477-6. - Vol. 54.2016, 19/20 (1/15.10.), p. 6216-6231
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Subject: | supply chain management | quality management | supply chain coordination | moral hazard | partial cost allocation contract | Lieferkette | Supply chain | Qualitätsmanagement | Quality management | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract |
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