Incitations managériales et oligopole : quels sont les effets de la compétence et des bénéfices privés de contrôle

In this paper, we consider an oligopolistic industry composed of two groups (or classes) of firms? owners producing differentiated goods. In one group, owners have a controlling power from which they can extract private benefits but the managers oppose them. In another group, owners are not interested by private benefits. Furthermore, each owner hires a manager to reduce its marginal cost, but she (or he) does not observe managerial effort. The focus is on the impacts of managerial ability, risk aversion and private benefits. The paper shows ? how they can play a key role in firm?s decisions variables such as The paper shows ? how they play a key role in firm?s decisions variables such as incentives, quantity, price, effort and managerial compensation and ? how they can be used to compare the performances of the two groups of firms.