Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Schmitz, Patrick W. |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 118.2013, 1, p. 94-96
|
Subject: | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Eigentumsrechtstheorie | Theory of property rights | Nichtregierungsorganisation | Non-governmental organization | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Investition | Investment | Anreiz | Incentives |
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