Incomplete information and rent dissipation in deterministic contests

René Kirkegaard

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Kirkegaard, René
Published in:	International journal of industrial organization. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187, ZDB-ID 875355-6. - Vol. 31.2013, 3, p. 261-266
Subject:	All-pay auctions \| Asymmetric auctions \| Rent seeking \| Rent-Seeking \| Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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