Incomplete-information models of guilt aversion in the trust game
Giuseppe Attanasi (Bureau of Economic Theory and Applications, CNRS, and University of Strasbourg, Strasbourg, France), Pierpaolo Battigalli (Department of Decision Sciences and Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy), Elena Manzoni (Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milano, Italy)
| Year of publication: |
March 2016
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Attanasi, Giuseppe ; Battigalli, Pierpaolo ; Manzoni, Elena |
| Published in: |
Management science : journal of the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0025-1909, ZDB-ID 206345-1. - Vol. 62.2016, 3, p. 648-667
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| Subject: | psychological games | Trust Game | guilt | incomplete information | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Vertrauen | Confidence | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Experiment | Ultimatumspiel | Ultimatum game |