Independent director networks and executive perquisite consumption : "collusion" or "coordination" in governance?
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Liu, Yuwei ; Ma, Sheng ; Tang, Xuesong |
Published in: |
Emerging markets, finance & trade : a journal of the Society for the Study of Emerging Markets. - Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis, ISSN 1558-0938, ZDB-ID 2095312-4. - Vol. 58.2022, 13, p. 3824-3839
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Subject: | collusion | coordination | executive perquisite consumption | Independent director | network centrality | Führungskräfte | Managers | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Soziales Netzwerk | Social network | Unternehmensnetzwerk | Business network | Theorie | Theory | Koordination | Coordination | Vorstand | Executive board | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
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