Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary
When contracts are unobserved, agents may have the incentive to promise the same asset to multiple counterparties and subsequently default. The author constructs an optimal mechanism that induces agents to reveal all their trades voluntarily. The mechanism allows agents to report every contract they enter, and it makes public the names of agents who have reached some prespecified position limit. In some cases, an agent's position limit must be higher than the number of contracts he enters in equilibrium. The mechanism has some features of a clearinghouse. ; Superseded by Working Paper 10/28R ; Supersedes Working Paper 05-12/R
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Leitner, Yaron |
Institutions: | Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia |
Saved in:
freely available
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Bond, Philip, (2009)
-
Financial networks: contagion, commitment, and private sector bailouts
Leitner, Yaron, (2004)
-
Courts and contractual innovation: a preliminary analysis
Berlin, Mitchell, (2005)
- More ...