Inequality aversion, reciprocity and efficiency - experimental studies on other regarding preferences

Balázs Rozsnyói

This thesis contributes to the research on other regarding preferences by experimental studies. Chapter 1 investigates the feasibility of efficiency gains in a principal-agent relationship by voluntary leadership. Chapter 2 investigates whether negative reciprocity can be documented if the worse off proposer does not create but even eliminates inequality at the responders cost. Chapter 3 is a principal-agent game. It investigates the performance and self-selection of heterogeneous agents in a group or an individual task. Chapter 4 investigates how the method of role uncertainty biases other regarding preferences in experimental games.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Rozsnyói, Balázs
Other Persons:	Königstein, Manfred (degree supervisor) ; Mehlkop, Guido (degree supervisor) ; Rockenbach, Bettina (degree supervisor)
Institutions:	Universität Erfurt <1994-> / Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät (degree granting)
Publisher:	Erfurt
Subject:	Experimental Economics \| Behavioral Game Theory \| Principal-Agent Relationship \| Inequality Aversion \| Quasi-Maximin Preferences \| Reciprocity \| Voluntary Leadership \| Role Uncertainty \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Austauschtheorie \| Social exchange theory \| Verhaltensökonomik \| Behavioral economics \| Experimentelle Ökonomik \| Experimental economics