Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers

This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Goldlücke, Susanne ; Kranz, Sebastian
Published in:	Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 147.2012, 3, p. 1191-1221
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Repeated games \| Computational methods \| Monetary transfers \| Imperfect public monitoring

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042946