Influence functions, followers and command games
We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function. In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function, and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Grabisch, Michel ; Rusinowska, Agnieszka |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 72.2011, 1, p. 123-138
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Influence function Follower function Lower and upper inverses Kernel Command game Command function Minimal sets generating a command game |
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